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sured motorist policy, subject to
the limits of the policy. The assumption that the settlement exhausts the liability policy will
avoid making the amount of the
insurer's liability dependent upon
the amount of the settlement the
insured accepts. It will also aid the
settlement process and thereby
benefit both the injured person and
the tortfeasor's liability insurer.
The court held that in the
present case the estate could recover from National the amount
which the actual damages exceeded
Bunse's $100,000 liability policy,
subject to the $20,000 underinsured motorist policy limit. The
court remanded the case to the
district court to determine the estate's actual damages.
The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Carter with two justices joining, argued that insurance policies
should be enforced unless they
conflict with statutory provisions.
Justice Carter found no such conflict between the exhaustion requirement and the statute that
requires underinsured motorist
coverage. He also found nothing
unreasonable in the underinsured
motorist policy's provision requiring exhaustion of the liability policy. The dissent added that if the
injured party settles before trial for
less than the liability policy limits,
the settlement amount indicates
the real worth of the claim. The
injured party may receive the underinsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exhaustion requirements, merely by fully litigating the claim.
Stephen Kirkwood
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Minnesota's Consumer
Protection Act Includes
Residential Leases, But
Florida's Consumer
Protection Act Excludes
Real Estate Sales
Minnesota and Florida enacted consumer protection acts in
order to protect consumers from
deceptive, unfair and discriminating practices of any trade, commerce or business. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals in Love v. Amsler,
441 N.W.2d 555 (Minn.App.
1989), construed its act broadly
and held that deceptive landlord
practices as related to residential
leases violated the Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act.
Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.68-325F.70
(1988). The Florida District Court
of Appeals in Kingswharfv. Kranz,
545 So. 2d 276 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.
1989), however, interpreted its act
narrowly and held that real estate
sales were not included in the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Fla. Stat. §§
501.201. - 501.213. (1988).

Love v. Amsler
In 1986, Boyd Amsler ("Amsler") rented a house to Marsha
Love ("Love") for $385.00 per
month plus utilities. Amsler kept
the water service in his name and
required Love to pay him directly
for the water bills he received.
However, Amsler never showed
Love a bill nor gave her a receipt
for the payments she made.
After renting for nine months,
Love withheld $113.00 from her
rent payment. Amsler filed a suit
against her for unpaid rent and
water bills and for attorney's fees.
He claimed $275.97 for unpaid
water bills incurred over seven
months. Love and Amsler settled
their dispute and Love planned to
vacate the house. Four days before
Love moved out, Amsler filed a
pro se action claiming $1,341.00
for unpaid rent and costs of cleaning the house. This time he claimed
that Love owed him $460.98 for
the water bills over the same seven
month period. Love filed suit
against Amsler in the Minnesota

District Court of Appeals for the
Third District for breach of the
covenant of habitability and violation of the Minnesota Prevention
of Consumer Fraud Act ("Minnesota Act"). Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.68 325F.70 (1988). Amsler's action
was joined as a counterclaim to
Love's suit.
The Minnesota District Court's
Decision: Landlord Violated the
Consumer Protection Act
At trial, a housing inspector
testified that numerous hazards
existed in the property Amsler
rented to Love. The gas space
heater which provided the only
heating source was declared unsafe
by the inspector. The house walls
were covered with soot. The gas
water heater was not properly ventilated and as a result potentially
lethal fumes backed up into the
living room. The house also had
dangerous electrical and structural
defects, serious flooding problems,
poor drainage, defective insulation
and a defective roof. Additionally,
Love presented evidence that Amsler had previously made claims
for over $27,000.00 in various
courts against 32 other tenants. In
his suits, Amsler usually claimed
unpaid water bills and cleaning
costs. Amsler also requested attorney's fees although he pursued the
cases on his own behalf.
The trial court found that
Amsler had violated the Minnesota
Act. That court held that Amsler's
pattern of requiring tenants to pay
unsubstantiated water bills, cleaning costs, and nonexistent attorney
fees constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices. Additionally,
the court held that because Amsler
had breached the covenant of habitability, Love could recover a portion of her previous rent payments
as damages. Amsler appealed.
The Court of Appeals of
Minnesota Affirms
The appellate court noted that
Minnesota courts had not determined whether the Minnesota Act
applied to leased housing, although
other states had included leased
(continued on page 26)
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Consumer Protection Act (from page 25)
housing within their consumer
protection acts. The Minnesota
Act prohibits
[t]he act [or] use.., by any
person of any ...

deceptive

practice, with the intent that
others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any
merchandise whether or not
any person has in fact been
misled, deceived, or damaged
thereby...
Minn. Stat. § 325F.69 subd. 1
(1988). The court readily noted
that Amsler fit within the statutory
definition of a person and that
residential real estate was within
the statutory definition of merchandise. The key issue before the
court was whether the term "sale"
included residential leases. The
statutory definition of a "sale"
neither explicitly included nor excluded leases.
After examining Minnesota and
other states' case law, the court
held that the Minnesota Act did
apply to residential leases. Minnesota case law acknowledged that a
lease transaction has a dual nature,
exhibiting characteristics of both a
sale of land and a contract. Traditionally, the Minnesota courts
have held that a lease is a transfer
of real property, for a limited period, in exchange for rent.
In addition to case law, the
court examined the Minnesota legislature's intent to determine
whether the Minnesota Act applied
to a lease. In designing the state
anti-fraud legislation, the legislature intended to give sellers and
consumers equal bargaining power
in the marketplace. The court
stated that the inadequate supply
of affordable housing and the unequal bargaining power between
landlords and tenants weighed in
favor of including residential
leases in the Minnesota Act. The
court noted that real estate sales
were protected by the Minnesota
Act and that it would be unreasonable to exclude the lease of real
estate.
26

Finally, the court noted that
the Minnesota Attorney General
had consistently applied the Minnesota Act to leases and landlord
conduct. For these reasons the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision to apply the Minnesota Act to landlords' deceptive
practices in residential leases.
Kingswharf v. Kranz
A Florida developer, Kingswharf, Ltd. ("Kingswharf"), developed a community of townhouses
called L'Hermitage. Scott Kranz
("Kranz") paid Kingswharf $355,000.00 for property and a house at
L'Hermitage. After closing the
transaction and taking possession
of the home, Kranz discovered
numerous construction defects.
The Florida Jury's Decision: Real
Estate Sale Violated the
Consumer Protection Act
Kranz filed suit against
Kingswharf alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty
and breach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act ("Florida Act" or "Act"), Fla.
Stat. §§ 501.201. - 501.213. (1988).
The jury returned a verdict for
Kranz and awarded him a total of
$275,000.
The Court of Appeals Decision:
Statutory Definition of A

Consumer Transaction Does Not
Include the Sale of Real Estate
Kingswharf argued the Florida Act does not apply to real estate
transactions. The appellate court
agreed. The Florida Act was intended to apply to consumer sale
practices. The Act defines a "con-

ful," evinces the legislature's intent
that the Act apply to real estate
transactions. The court noted that
although the broad language of this
subsection would seem to include
real estate sales, the legislature did
not expressly include real estate
sales in the definition of a consumer transaction, and the court
was not willing to add to the
definition.
Kranz cited Anden v. Litinsky, 472 So. 2d 825 (Fla. App. 4th
Dist. 1985), as support for his
argument. In Anden, the plaintiff
claimed the corporate officer violated the Florida Act by falsely
claiming that he was qualified to
supervise the building of a house.
The court in the present case distinguished Anden on the basis that
the supervision of construction is a
service. The Florida Act expressly
includes services provided for primarily personal, family, or household purposes within the definition of a "consumer transaction."
In contrast to the defendant in
Anden, Kingswharf was involved
in a real estate sale which is not
considered a consumer transaction
under the Florida Act.
Therefore, the appellate court
reversed the jury's verdict against
Kingswharf for violating the Florida Act and instructed the trial
court to direct a verdict for Kingswharf.
Cathleen R. Martwick

sumer transaction" as ". . a sale,
lease, assignment ...or other dis-

position of an item of goods, a
consumer service or an intangible. . .

."
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